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Preface 
If we hold to the conviction all Canadians are equal, deserving of the same rights and 
privileges, opportunities and obligations; if we truly believe those things to be self-evident, then 
we must accept, embrace and pursue public policies which promote income equality and 
wealth redistribution. Once it is generally accepted that the wealthy should share more of their 
wealth with the poor through increased taxation burden, and by paying a greater share of the 
costs of supplying public goods and services, opportunities to implement public policy that 
achieve these outcomes are vast and far reaching. 
 
A recent study has revealed that there is great discrepancy in what Canadians believe the 
ideal distribution of wealth should be in Canada, what they perceive the current distribution of 
wealth to be, and the actual distribution of wealth (Broadbent Institute, 2014). In short, 
Canadians desire the distribution of wealth to be much fairer than they thought it was 
currently, and the wealth inequality currently is greater than most Canadians thought it to be. 
The table below was developed from data published in this study. 
 
Wealth Distribution Category 
Poorest 20% 
of Canadians 
Middle 60% of 
Canadians 
Wealthiest 
20% of 
Canadians 
Canadians ideal wealth distribution 11.5% 58.5% 30% 
Canadians perception of wealth 
distribution  
6% 38.5 55.5% 
The actual distribution of wealth in 
Canada 
<1% 29% 70% 
 
Additionally, the study indicated that the bottom 50% of Canadians own less than 6% of 
the wealth, the top 50% own the remaining 94%, and the wealthiest 1% of Canadians own 20% 
of the country’s wealth. This data suggests Canada is far from the socially progressive nation it 
generally claims to be. As citizens, we can collectively determine public policy decisions that 
redistribute the wealth in our country and in our local communities.  
Far too often local governments hide behind the premise that income and wealth 
redistribution is a responsibility of the Federal and Provincial Government, achieved through 
the use of more appropriate redistributive revenue sources such as income and commodity 
taxes. As a result of ignorance, or a general disregard for the ability to impact change, local 
governments fail to acknowledge the role they can play in advancing social equity through 
progressive local government public policy. 
Canadians enjoy some of the most accessible and affordable drinking water in the world, 
but the opportunity for progressive pricing policy should not be ignored as a result. The title of 
this paper, WaterRight, is an adaptation of the title of a report which examined the state of 
drinking water systems and provided advice on the organization and long-term financing of 
Ontario’s water and wastewater systems (“WaterTight: The case for change in Ontario's water 
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and wastewater sector”). The purpose of this report however will be to discuss the human right 
to safe, clean and affordable drinking water, and local government influence in improving 
affordability through progressive public policy (an area the WaterTight report generally 
dismissed in the pursuit of regulatory compliance, quality assurance, and financial sustainability 
of water systems).  
 
By examining the cost of water in a cluster of communities in Southwestern Ontario in 
relation to the average incomes in those communities, this report will answer the question:  
How affordable is drinking water in Ontario communities, and how can municipal pricing 
strategies improve affordability and advance social equity? 
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Executive Summary 
There is an extensive regulatory framework embodying the operational supply of drinking 
water in Ontario, including the need for all municipalities to provide a self-sustaining financial 
plan for their system. This has resulted in the price of water in Ontario significantly outpacing 
the Consumer Price Index and general property taxation rates. This cost increase is impacting 
Ontario residents, causing poorer residents to pay a larger percentage of their disposable 
income on water required for basic human needs.  
 
At the local level, water pricing is often established with little attention to how water rate 
policy impacts affordability. While provincial regulation is thorough from a quality assurance 
approach, it is silent on the matter of ensuring residential water affordability. Beyond aggregate 
financial data collection and reporting through annual benchmarking and data collection 
initiatives such as the annual BMA Management Consulting Inc. Municipal Competitiveness 
Study (BMA Study), there is very little published work examining current water pricing, pricing 
methodologies, and the affordability of water for Ontario residents. 
 
Actual water rate data collected and examined from the eight most Southern 
municipalities in Southwestern Ontario revealed: 
 
 There is great variation in water pricing between neighbouring communities.  
 Water can be considered very affordable in all communities examined, failing to reach 
even 1% of average household income in all cases. 
 Water can be considered affordable in most cases for residents that rely on the basic 
minimum income subsidies associated with the three main social support mechanisms 
in Ontario (ODSP, Ontario Works, Guaranteed income supplement). 
 
How governments elect to charge for public goods and services, the tools utilized to 
recover costs, and the way in which those cost recovery tools are structured can have a 
profound impact on the both public policy outcomes, as well as the share of financial burden 
assumed by different groups in a community.  
 
Municipalities wishing to implement intelligent and strategic tax policy to improve 
affordability and social equity in their communities, can establish water rate models to achieve 
the desired outcomes. In developing a more equitable pricing framework, municipalities can: 
 
 Use alternative revenue sources to cover the cost of supply water  
 Use strategic inclining block tariff structures to charge for water consumed 
 Minimize the fixed charges portion of residential water bills 
 
Despite the general affordability of water, municipalities can determine pricing strategies 
that shift some of the cost burden from those with the least ability to pay, to those with a 
greater ability to pay, through the implementation of intelligent tax policy developed under a 
strategically planned tax policy framework.   
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Part 1: The Right to Water, Water Pricing, and Poverty 
1.1 Introduction 
As the treatment and supply of drinking water in Ontario is now almost entirely the 
responsibility of local governments (primarily municipalities), the method of determining how 
residents pay to access clean drinking water is quite diverse and locally determined. This 
diversity in rate structure inevitably results in a variation of outcomes impacting water 
affordability for residents, and has a variety of consequences that affect social equity. One such 
consequence is that poorer residents end up paying a larger percentage of their disposable 
income on water required for basic human needs (Wasimi & Hassa, 2012) (OECD, 2002). As the 
concept of social equity can vary given the associated context, this paper will generally rely on 
the National Academy of Public Administration definition, which defines social equity in 
governance as: “The fair, just and equitable management of all institutions serving the public 
directly or by contract; the fair, just and equitable distribution of public services and 
implementation of public policy; and the commitment to promote fairness, justice, and equity in 
the formation of public policy” (National Academy of Public Administration, 2017). 
The lack of competition for the delivery of drinking water demands a level of diligent 
financial oversight to ensure affordability, if not through provincial regulation, then checked by 
way of popular opinion and balanced through election cycles. However, water pricing at the 
local level is often established with little attention to how water rate policy impacts 
affordability, leaving the real rates charged for water (or worse, the year over year cost 
increase), to dominate the public debate (what little exists) on the matter. Provincial regulation 
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is thorough from a quality assurance approach, and mandates water system financial plans, but 
is silent on the matter of ensuring residential water affordability (Safe Drinking Water Act, 
2002).  
There is an extensive regulatory framework embodying the operational supply of drinking 
water in Ontario, including the need for all municipalities to provide a self-sustaining financial 
plan for their system. Depending on where one lives in the province, they may pay drastically 
different prices for residential drinking water (BMA, 2015), determined under different sets of 
factors used to calculate that price. Even more perverse, neighbouring municipal water utilities 
within the same region, often with similar water supply management organization, charge 
substantially different rates for drinking water. The different ‘sets of rules’, or ‘rate models’, 
impact residential water affordability in different ways, and influence social equity in different 
ways. One such way is to change the percentage of disposable income Ontario residents spend 
on drinking water. 
The aim of the research paper is to examine this variation in pricing and pricing 
methodologies, to examine affordability generally and affordability for the poor in Ontario 
specifically, and to make recommendations on the approach to water pricing policy in Ontario 
that can improve affordability and advance social equity. Through examining the existing water 
rates and water rate models implemented by a cluster of municipalities in Southwestern 
Ontario, the variations can be used to compare, contrast, and examine these policy decisions 
through a lens of affordability and social equity.  
It is critical to initiate and participate in dialogue on matters of public importance. In the 
context of affordable drinking water, this is true for all politicians and administrators who carry 
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the burden of governance. In addition to the utilization of regressive water rate models used by 
most municipalities, the price of water in Ontario is significantly outpacing the Consumer Price 
Index and general property taxation rates; this is exacerbating the affordability concern. In the 
period between 2005 and 2015 average water prices in Ontario rose 3.8% in major 
municipalities (Di Matteo, 2016). Very little research has examined the impact this is having on 
Ontario’s poor, with an eye to improving water pricing models to minimize the regressive 
effects.  
There are many public goods and quasi-public goods supplied by local governments in 
Ontario that are funded through general property taxation; road services, parks services, 
policing, fire services and recreation services to name a few. Property tax is a more regressive 
tax tool than other forms of taxation, such as income tax, as the ability to pay the tax has less 
correlation to the amount of tax charged. Additionally, property tax has shortcomings when 
conceptualized as a ‘wealth tax’, since there is often great disparity in the market value of 
property (from which the tax payable is calculated in Ontario) and the owned equity in the 
property (Thompson, 2014). However, property taxation can be considered more progressive 
than flat user fees, as people with higher incomes typically own more valuable homes (SACES, 
2004). User fees on the other hand blatantly discriminate between the wealthy and the poor 
unless they are linked to some form of income based subsidy.   
The research conducted as part of this paper will examine the use of volumetric fees, in 
conjunction with or as opposed to fixed user fees, and rely on the literature to further evaluate 
this practice from a social equity perspective. One possibility is that the reliance on user fees is 
linked more strongly to the ease and simplicity of measuring water consumption (water is 
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supplied under pressure and every home can be easily equipped with a device to measure 
exactly how much water is consumed), than to a sophisticated determination of appropriate 
public policy or the appropriateness of user fees over general taxation. In other words, the 
mechanisms used to recover the cost of supplying drinking water (user fees over taxation) seem 
to be established more as a matter of convenience, than through strategic public policy 
development. While social equity and affordability of water has received much attention in the 
academic literature, the ability to pay typically plays a small role in the determination of water 
rates in practice in Ontario.  
This paper will also examine the affordability of water in the eight municipalities of 
Windsor and Essex County. Using actual water rate data collected from the municipalities, 
affordability will be measured using an internationally recognized drinking water affordability 
threshold. This examination will occur both for income of the average household in the 
community, as well as for the poorest residents, whose incomes are dependent on the 
guaranteed minimum incomes established for the three primary income support programs in 
the Province of Ontario. The cost of water, when compared against income and measured 
against an affordability threshold, will reveal the level of affordability of drinking water in these 
communities. The 2015 BMA Management Consulting Inc., Municipal Competitiveness Study 
(BMA Study) will be used to examine the actual rate methodologies currently utilized by a large 
sample of Ontario municipalities. By examining these pricing methodologies against the 
expected policy outcomes of each model, insight can be gained into the level of sophistication 
and fairness of the pricing models currently used in practice. 
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Beyond aggregate financial data collection and reporting  through annual benchmarking 
and data collection initiatives such as the annual BMA Study, there is very little published work 
examining current water pricing and pricing models in Ontario. Furthermore, literature 
examining water rates from a social equity perspective in an Ontario context is even scarcer.  
Most of the published literature examining water pricing in Canada is focused on the need to 
establish pricing models that result in full cost recovery, though defining ‘cost’ can be rather 
subjective as will be discussed later. Efforts during the literature review of this paper failed to 
identify any research in the Canadian context that examined water rates through the lens of 
affordability and social equity, though a number of studies of this nature have been conducted 
in Europe, Australia, and other jurisdictions. 
Every province in Canada has a unique model for the delivery of the provision of public 
goods. How the costs of providing public goods and services are shared by the various levels of 
governments (who pays for what and under what tax/revenue tool), will impact on the 
preferred method of water pricing. As each component of the provision of service does not 
exist in a vacuum, but forms an interrelated basket of public goods and support services, an 
Ontario centric approach to the policy examination is of the utmost importance.  
Water rate models instituted at the local level do have societal impact; some models are 
progressive in nature, others are regressive. The poor spend a disproportionate amount of their 
disposable income on buying drinking water compared to the wealthy. Municipalities have 
great influence on the lessening or the worsening of this phenomena; the municipal sector 
must understand this reality in order to make informed public policy decisions. 
Page 12 of 57 
 
1.2 Water and Poverty 
The lack of access to clean, safe drinking water is a global crisis. Each day, over 2,000 
children die from water borne illness (Liu & et al, 2012). This is one of the reasons why the 
international community, and the UN has made access to drinking water a declared human 
right (UNGA, 2010), and the expansion of drinking water systems, especially in the developing 
world, a global humanitarian initiative. Beyond access, affordability of drinking water is also a 
major global concern. Increased regulation, aging first and second generation water treatment 
systems, difficulties in treating ever more polluted water, and the effects of global warming are 
all driving up the cost of water for the consumer. 
The global crisis of access and affordability of drinking water is not universally distributed. 
As can be expected, some nations of the world, such as many countries on the continent of 
Africa, and most in the Middle East, have significant access challenges, while other nations, 
such as Canada, the United States and Brazil have an abundance of fresh water supply (UN 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2010). Similarly, some countries have 
significant affordability challenges related to drinking water, while others have been recognized 
as having no problems or concerns with water affordability (OECD, 2002). As an example, water 
charges in Europe are on average four times higher than they are in Canada, making 
affordability a much greater concern for European public policy makers (Vander Ploeg, 2011).  
However, the relative affordability of Canadian drinking water should not preclude policy 
makers from examining the impacts that pricing methodology, formed as part of an intelligent 
tax policy framework, can have on advancing social equity and improving affordability for those 
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who can least afford to pay.  This paper will rely on the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) affordability threshold of requiring water cost to be less than 3% of 
household income to be considered affordable (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, 2010). 
Given that Canada is a nation that has been generally recognized as having neither access 
or affordability challenges (when compared to other nations), it can be easy to assume that 
access, and more relevant to this paper, affordability, is not a matter worthy of further 
discussion or public policy consideration; such is not the case. Access to clean water on 
Canadian First Nations reserves has been declared a crisis by Human Rights Watch (Human 
Rights Watch, 2016). What general affordability indicators fail to recognize is the water 
affordability challenges for the poorest Canadians. This paper will examine water affordability 
for the poorest Canadians living in the province of Ontario. To do this, the basic minimum 
subsidies associated with the three main social support mechanisms (ODSP, Ontario Works, 
Guaranteed income supplement) will be examined to determine the amount of income that 
these groups must devote to drinking water and sanitation. Regardless of the general 
affordability of water, pricing methodologies can still be implemented to lessen the impacts of 
the regressive nature of user fees, and shift costs from lower income households to higher 
income households and to commercial enterprises. 
1.3 The Human Right to Water 
In 2010, the United Nations General Assembly recognized the Human Right to Water as 
being essential to the full enjoyment of life (UNGA, 2010). The consequence of this resolution is 
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to recognize that access to safe drinking water is a legal entitlement rather than a commodity 
or service, and to make available the United Nations human rights system to monitor the 
progress of nations in realizing the right to water while holding governments accountable (UN-
Water Decade Programme on Advocacy and Communication and Water Supply and Sanitation 
Collaborative Council, 2011).  In defining how the Human Right to water was to be determined, 
the following five criteria were established: availability; accessibility; quality and safety; 
affordability; and acceptability. With regards to affordability, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) has identified water as affordable if costs do not exceed 3 per cent of 
household income. 
The concept of water as a human right brings forth the need to examine other 
characteristics, such as; examining water as a public good, determining responsibilities for 
providing service and owning infrastructure, the design of associated financial models, and 
providing access to water for individuals with an inability to pay (Brown, Neves-Silva, & Hellor, 
2016). It is primarily for these considerations, and the desire for sovereignty in managing their 
own resources, that Canada elected to abstain from voting on the UN resolution (Water 
Canada, 2010).  
Ontario has some of the strictest water quality assurance regulations in the world (SDWA, 
2002), but the supply of drinking water is much different for First Nations indigenous peoples 
living on reserves. Currently, there are no binding regulations for the treatment and supply of 
drinking water on First Nations Reserves in Canada (Human Rights Watch, 2016). As can be 
expected, this has led to drastic underfunding of water treatment systems (where they do 
exist), illness resulting from drinking inadequately treated water, and severe access issues on 
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First Nations Reserves (Human Rights Watch, 2016). A staggering 73% of First Nations Water 
Systems in Canada are at high to medium risk for contamination (The Council of Canadians, 
2017). While 10% of people living in off-reserve communities in Ontario get their drinking water 
from private wells (Environment Canada, 2011), that number doubles to 20% of households 
living on reserves (Human Rights Watch, 2016). The crisis related to the lack of access to clean 
drinking water on First Nations Reserves, described as being comparable to ‘third world 
conditions’ (Levasseur & Marcoux, 2015), is considered by many to be a violation of the human 
right to water (Suzuki, 2017), (Human Rights Watch, 2016). While this paper will not examine 
the current state of water systems on First Nations Reserves, it must be acknowledged that 
there are two very distinct narratives regarding the supply of drinking water in Canada; one for 
indigenous peoples living on reserves, and another for everyone else.  
Despite the United Nations resolution identifying clean drinking water as human right 
essential to the full enjoyment of life and all other human rights, Canadian regulatory 
requirements that mandate the delivery of all the criteria identified in UN declaration, and 
affordability in particular, do not exist. Thus the organizations providing drinking water to 
Ontario residents are not legally bound to ensure measures of affordability within their pricing 
methodology.  
1.4 The History of the Supply of Drinking Water in Ontario 
1.4.1 In the Beginning 
Like many utility corporations that are now considered to be a predominately 
government owned or highly regulated industry, the first waterworks infrastructures built in 
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cities in the Province of Ontario were developed under private ownership and were profit 
generating ventures (Sancton, 2015).   These systems typically served two purposes; to bring a 
supply of untreated raw drinking water from lakes, and to provide a means to fight urban fires. 
(OSWCA, 2001)  The first water systems in Ontario were built in Toronto in the 1840’s (City of 
Toronto, 2017).  In the decades that followed, local and central governments saw the need to 
be involved in the supply of water for the greater good of the people.  
It took over a half a century for the two most significant pieces of provincial legislation of 
the era affecting the safe supply of drinking water to be passed in the Province. The Municipal 
Waterworks Act (1882) and the Public Health Act (1884) permitted the creation of municipal 
water treatment facilities that could be paid for through property taxation, and the 
establishment of the Public Health Board respectively. The Public Health Board used the Public 
Health Act to manage matters that impacted water quality such as sanitary sewage disposal and 
industrial discharge (OSWCA, 2001).  As time progressed throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century, research and advancement within the scientific and medical communities 
identified the consumption of untreated water as a source of human illness, and water 
treatment as a method for disease prevention. 
1.4.2 Ontario Water Resources Commission 
In the face of overwhelming evidence of the importance of safe clean drinking water on 
human health, the polluting of the great lakes and the lack of a coordinated effort to build, 
maintain and renew adequate water and wastewater facilities, the province of Ontario passed 
the Ontario Water Resources Commission Act (1956) which established the Ontario Water 
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Resources Commission. The Ontario Water Resource Commission, among other things, was 
charged with regulating water treatment and supply in the province. The Commission financed, 
built and operated water and wastewater systems and regulated the use of Ontario’s water 
resources (Scott, 1969).  It was through the OWRC that the first comprehensive inspection and 
testing programs were developed in the province. Additionally, the OWRC developed the first 
training, testing and licensing of water system operators (OSWCA, 2001). 
Since the establishment of the OWRC (1956-1973), Ministry of the Environment 
ownership, management and regulation (1973-1993), and the development of the Ontario 
Clean Water Agency (a crown corporation established to address a regulator-owner/operator 
conflict of the MOE, 1993-present), a provincial body has existed to provide drinking water 
oversight responsibility and operational services to municipalities. Provincial involvement still 
exists today in all aspects except infrastructure ownership which has been primarily the 
responsibility of Ontario Municipalities in the years that followed the Water and Sewer Services 
Improvement Act, 1997. The almost exclusive municipal ownership presented a localized 
approach to water management, pricing and quality assurance; the latter resulting in a tragedy 
of failed stewardship: the Walkerton Water Crisis. 
1.4.3 The Impact of the Walkerton Water Crisis 
A discussion on the provision of the delivery of water services by municipalities in Ontario 
would be remiss if it did not include at least a brief discussion on the events surrounding the 
Walkerton, Ontario water crisis. While this paper is primarily intended to examine affordability 
and equity in water pricing, the Walkerton tragedy has played a dramatic role in expanding the 
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quality assurance aspects of Ontario’s water system. This quality assurance program has 
impacted water pricing. While it should not be argued that system safety should come at the 
expense of affordable pricing, it should be recognized that the expanded regulatory 
environment has led to greater operating expenses, and an expanded focus on sustainability. 
This has in turn resulted in the rapid acceleration of water price increases at the local level.  
In May 2000, the drinking water system of Walkerton Ontario, became contaminated 
with a virulent strain of E. coli. Waste from a local cattle farm was washed into a shallow well 
located near the farm as a result of heavy rains. Both the equipment installed to treat the 
water, as well as the staff hired to manage the quality of the water, failed to deliver on the 
expectations, though for very different reasons. In this town of 4,800 people, located within 
Bruce County, 2,300 people became ill and seven died. Many of those who survived suffered 
permanent damage to their health (Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal, 2005). 
In the aftermath of the Walkerton crisis, inquiries were conducted and expert panels 
assembled. In response to the recommendations of the inquiries, the Safe Drinking Water Act 
was passed in 2002. The stated purpose of the Safe Drinking Water Act, 2002 is: 
1. To recognize that the people of Ontario are entitled to expect their drinking water to 
be safe. 
2. To provide for the protection of human health and the prevention of drinking water 
health hazards through the control and regulation of drinking water systems and 
drinking water testing (SDWA, 2002). 
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One of the main requirements of the Act is the mandatory licensing of municipal water 
providers. While the regulatory framework has improved the quality assurance and regulatory 
aspects of drinking water systems, it has also increased the cost of providing drinking water. In 
the period between 2005 and 2015, average water prices in Ontario rose 3.8% in major 
municipalities, outpacing both CPI as well as property taxation (Di Matteo, 2016). It would be 
difficult to determine the exact impact the Walkerton water crisis (and the resulting legislation 
and regulatory regime) had on water system affordability. However, the rapid acceleration of 
regulatory requirements, the associated costs of compliance, the mandated financial planning 
and sustainability requirements, coupled with the lack of general oversight with regards to 
affordability, has generally resulted in increased costs to operate systems and thus increased 
the cost of water for residents. 
1.4.5 The Clean Water Act and Financial Plans for Municipal Water Systems 
After the events of the Walkerton, ON water tragedy briefly explored earlier, the Ontario 
government passed the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 2002 in order to more effectively 
control and regulate drinking water systems. In 2007, the Province of Ontario enacted 
Regulation 453/07 under the SWDA. This regulation required all municipal drinking water 
systems to develop a financial plan, in accordance with the regulation, prior to obtaining or 
renewing their drinking water license.  
The Financial Plans of a Municipal Drinking Water System must: 
i) include a statement that the financial impacts of the drinking water system have 
been considered 
ii) apply for a period of at least six years 
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iii) include details of the proposed or projected financial operations of the drinking 
water system 
iv) projected financial position of the drinking water system 
v) proposed or projected gross cash receipts and gross cash payments 
vi) be available to members of the public  
vii)        give a copy of the financial plans to the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing.  
 
As can be seen from the seven mandatory requirements, much discretion is afforded to 
local municipalities in determining the means to a financially sustainable end. Mandatory 
financial plans require municipalities to price water such that the water system is sustainable in 
both the short and long term. How municipalities typically determine the method to determine 
pricing is explored below. 
1.5 Water Pricing Models  
When a government supplies drinking water to their residents, there are a number of 
different pricing models they can implement to recover the cost of operating the system. While 
if estimated accurately, these models can all be used to collect enough revenue to cover costs, 
these models impact affordability, equity, and water conservation in different ways. Most 
pricing models will generally fall into one of the following categories: 
1.5.1 No Direct Charges to Users  
Some governments have elected to not charge for drinking water directly, instead 
electing to cover the cost of drinking water through other taxation mechanisms. This can either 
be a result of the lack of sophistication of the drinking water treatment or supply system (many 
poorer nations), or because of specific public policy decisions not to charge. As an example, the 
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country of Ireland did not directly charge for drinking water until 2014 (The Irish Times, 2014). 
Public policy makers in Ireland chose instead to fund the cost of drinking water through other 
taxation mechanisms. If it were not for the austerity measures imposed on Ireland by the 
European Union and the International Monetary Fund under terms of the 2009 bailout package 
(which required Ireland to begin charging for water and wastewater services), the model of no 
direct charges would likely still be in place today (McIntyre, 2014). 
1.5.2 Flat Fee Per Connection 
The least sophisticated of all pricing models is the flat fee pricing model. Every user is 
charged a fee for their connection and access to water, based on the type of connection (i.e. 
residential, commercial, industrial). Under this pricing model, there are no meters installed and 
therefore no volumetric charges. This results in very high volume users of water paying the 
same cost for access and usage as very small volume users of water. To achieve financial 
sustainability, the total cost of supplying drinking water in a given municipality is divided by the 
number of users, and the result determines the cost the user will pay for access to water. The 
benefits of this model are primarily related to the simplicity in development and management. 
The shortcomings include the lack of incentive to conserve and unfairness (as cost is not tied to 
consumption). With regards to conservation, residential users in Canada under a flat user rate 
system consume 65% more water on average per capita than users with meters and volumetric 
charges (Environment Canada, 2011). 
The flat fee per connection model can be illustrated as follows: 
F = TC/U 
F=Fee per User; TC=Total Cost of Water; U=Number of users of the system 
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1.5.3 Volumetric Charges 
To have a fee system based on volumetric charges, each user must be connected to a 
meter which measures the volume of consumption and charges users a fee based on the 
amount of water they consume. Most water systems that utilize a volumetric pricing strategy, 
also incorporate a fixed charge(s) in addition to the volumetric charge. The fixed charge 
component is intended to provide a degree of revenue stability for system operators. The value 
of the fixed charge in relation to the volumetric charges and ultimately the total bill is a matter 
of local policy. It is important to note however that the greater the fixed charge in relation to 
volumetric charges, the less incentive there is to conserve water through less consumption, and 
the lesser the degree of control a user has over the relative cost of water. In the examination of 
municipal billing structures discussed later in this paper, the municipalities reviewed had a fixed 
charge component ranging from a low of 24% to a high of 62%. While a 62% fixed charge 
provides greater revenue stability, it discourages conservation and increases the average cost 
of water for lower volume water users.  
Within the volumetric charge pricing framework, there are different approaches to 
pricing each unit (typically a cubic meter in Canada), of water consumed. These approaches 
include the following: 
Flat Rate Volumetric Charge 
In a flat rate volumetric charge approach, every volumetric unit consumed is billed out at 
the same rate or price regardless of the total volume consumed. This can include a model that 
charges all users of the system the same price per unit, or a model that differentiates users by 
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class (i.e. residential, commercial, industrial) and establishes a rate for each class that may or 
may not be the same as the other classes. 
Inclining Block Tariff 
Inclining block tariff structures increase the cost per unit of water as consumption rises 
beyond established thresholds. This model is generally considered to be the most effective 
model to promote conservation as users pay a higher fee for a volumetric unit of water once 
certain consumption volume thresholds are surpassed. Additionally, equity in pricing is 
improved in this model as higher volume users pay more on average per unit of consumption 
than do lower volume users. Since high income households consume more water than low 
income households (Wasimi & Hassa, 2012), wealthier users contribute more to covering the 
costs of operating the water system by paying a higher average unit of cost than poorer users. 
Declining Block Tariff 
Declining block tariff structure decreases the cost per unit of water as consumption rises 
beyond established thresholds (similar to inclining block tariff, only in reverse). The rates 
charged per unit of water begins with the most expensive rate, then declines as consumption 
increases, ending in the least expensive rate per unit being the last unit consumed. While this 
model is generally recognized to have efficiency benefits typically associated with volume 
discount incentives, it is the least effective at managing the conservation aspect of water use. 
Fixed charges are able to be spread over more units with the promotion of a greater 
consumption, thus decreasing the average rate charged as consumption volumes increase. The 
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implementation of this pricing structure places system revenue maximization above 
conservation or pricing equity. 
Humpback Tariff 
The humpback tariff model utilizes both an inclining block structure for the first blocks of 
consumption, until eventual price plateauing, followed by a declining block structure for very 
large volume users. This structure is implemented with the intent of promoting conservation 
for most users of the system (typically residential), while providing volume discounts for large 
users (industrial, commercial) of the system to recognize the declining incremental cost of 
supplying an additional unit of water to the user.  
A Mix of Fixed Charges and Volumetric Charges 
To try and address the revenue volatility associated with the sole use of volumetric 
charges, most municipalities utilize a combination of fixed monthly fees, in addition to 
volumetric charges (based typically on one of the four volumetric charge methodologies 
discussed above). As municipalities have large fixed costs associated with the treatment and 
distribution of drinking water, fixed charges help to guarantee a base amount of annual 
expected income. Thus for many water consumers in Ontario, there will be a minimum monthly 
charge (the fixed charge component), in addition to volumetric charges. Determining the ratio 
between fixed and volumetric charges varies from water provider to water provider, and is 
determined through local policy decisions. The higher the ratio of fixed fees, the more the 
system will resemble a flat fee pricing method, and the less the incentive to conserve (though 
revenue certainty for the utility increases). With a low ratio of fixed charges to volumetric 
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charges, the greater amount of the household water bill will be linked to consumption, the 
greater incentive to conserve, and the user will more control over the amount of the bill. 
A 2015 survey of water rate structures of 100 Ontario municipalities revealed that 89% of 
municipalities have a fixed charge component built in to their pricing methodology. Of the 100 
municipalities, the fixed charge component of the bill ranged from 100% (flat fee per 
connection) of the bill to 0% (all volumetric charges) of the bill (BMA, 2015). Overwhelmingly, 
the preferred billing methodology is a volumetric charge methodology (97%), with a fixed 
charge component (89%), using a uniform/flat rate volumetric charge per unit (65%). Additional 
details regarding the way in which municipalities are charging for water (and wastewater), are 
found in Table 1 below.   
Table 1: Ontario Municipal Water Rate Structures: 2015 
Water                                Water Rate 
Rate Billing                       Structure ‐                                                                               
Structure                           Res.  
Water Rate 
Structure ‐ 
Non‐Res. 
WW Rate 
Structure ‐ 
Res. 
WW Rate 
Structure ‐
Non‐Res. 
Uniform 65% 66% 67% 68% 
Declining 12% 14% 12% 13% 
Inclining 9% 7% 7% 6% 
Humpback 11% 11% 11% 11% 
Flat 3% 2% 3% 2% 
  *Source: 2015 BMA Study 
The fact that only 3% of municipalities surveyed are using the flat fee per connection is a 
signal that Ontario municipalities are becoming more sophisticated in the management and 
pricing of their water systems. As was discussed earlier, charging for water based on volume 
consumed will lead to water conservation.  Of the 97% using volumetric billing structures 
however, only 32% have implemented the next level of sophistication (inclining, declining and 
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humpback), in an attempt to strategically manage consumer consumption, user cost sharing, 
and to achieve specific public policy outcomes.  
1.6 Public Goods and Services, Taxation and User Fees 
How governments elect to charge for public goods and services, the tools utilized to 
recover costs, and the way in which those cost recovery tools are structured can have a 
profound impact on both public policy outcomes, as well as the share of financial burden 
assumed by different groups in a community. The relatively recent push towards water system 
financial sustainability has driven most municipal systems to recover the cost of providing 
drinking water through a user fee system. As flat user fees are blatantly indiscriminate between 
the rich and the poor, a strategic approach must be taken to develop a more intelligent user fee 
system which can have positive policy outcomes.  
There are a vast array of public goods and services provided by the Federal government, 
Provincial/Territorial governments, and Municipal governments in Canada. Sections 91-95 of 
the 1867 Constitution determined jurisdictional authority through the distribution of legislative 
powers over goods and services supplied to the Canadian people, and which level; federal or 
provincial, has jurisdiction in that sphere (Beaudoin, 1990). Municipalities are not 
constitutionally guaranteed in Canada, but are created, and afforded the ability to exist, 
through provincial legislation. All authorities to act are granted to municipalities through 
provincial legislation. In Ontario, the primary piece of legislation is the Ontario Municipal Act, 
2001, though there are many other Acts that grant powers and demand obligations of Ontario 
municipal corporations.  
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The chart below illustrates some of the more important public goods and services 
provided to Canadian residents, and the level of government designated jurisdictional authority 
under the Constitution. Again, all municipal authority is actually an authority of the provincial 
government, delegated to municipalities through provincial legislation.  
Table 2: Legislative Authority in Canada 
Federal jurisdiction 
 
Provincial jurisdiction 
 
Shared jurisdiction 
 
 
 Trade 
 Taxes 
 Postal service 
 Militia and defence 
 Currency and banks 
 Indian policies 
 Criminal law 
 Residual powers (not 
defined in the British 
North America Act) 
 Right of disallowance 
over the provinces 
 
 
 Public lands and 
forests 
 Health system 
 Municipal 
institutions 
 Marriage 
 Property and civil 
rights 
 Education 
 Business licences 
 Provincial 
constitution 
 Shared jurisdiction 
 
 
 Agriculture 
 Companies and 
economic 
development 
 Prisons and justice 
 Fishing 
 Public works 
 Transportations 
and 
communications 
 Immigration 
 
Source: (University of Ottawa, 2017).  https://slmc.uottawa.ca/?q=laws_canada_legal 
 
With the exception of targeted Federal and Provincial grants and transfer payments, as 
well as restrictions on the use of some charges levied upon residents, developers and business 
for specific purposes, municipalities have relative freedom in determining how to fund the cost 
of supplying goods and services to residents. The primary sources of revenue under the direct 
control of municipalities include property taxation, and user fees and charges. The policy 
decisions that municipal Councils make regarding what goods and services will be funded from 
what revenue source, and how those user fees and taxation rates are determined, can have an 
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impact on social equity (either positively or negatively) and make goods and services available 
and affordable to a broader range of residents. The policy decisions can also limit the access to 
goods and services due to unaffordability, and create excessive burden on the poorest 
residents. The two primary own source revenue tools available to municipalities will now be 
explored in more detail. 
1.6.1 Property Taxation 
The History of Property Tax 
The concept of taxing property is far from a modern phenomenon. Some of the earliest 
documented practices of systematic property taxation came from the ancient Egyptians (5000 
B.C.), who applied taxation policies associated with production value of privately owned lands 
(on items such as crop yields and livestock production) (Carlson, 2005).  During medieval times 
in western civilizations, taxes on land, production resulting from land, and taxes on personal 
property were levied by both church and state (who in many respects were indistinguishable 
from one another during that era). In more modern times, one of the first forms of property 
taxation in the ‘new world’ was implemented by the Puritans in Boston, who levied property 
tax to pay for the church and the religious education of their children. It was in Boston that 
some of the first modern practices of levying property tax to pay for local services such as 
policing, education, defense and various forms of public infrastructure, were implemented in 
North America (Carlson, 2005). 
This very brief historical review of property tax is intended to illustrate that the act of 
taxing property has been used since the dawn of civilization, and continues to be used today 
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almost everywhere in the developed world. It should be expected that the practice of taxing 
property will exist well into the foreseeable future, and property taxation is expected to remain 
the primary source of revenue for municipalities. 
Property Tax in Ontario 
Despite property tax representing only 10.5% of the total tax burden of the average 
Canadian family, property tax is commonly recognized as a very unpopular form of taxation. At 
10.5%, property tax ranks fourth, behind income tax (30.6%), payroll and health taxes (21.5%), 
and sales/commodity tax (14.4%) (Fraser Institute, 2015). Despite this relatively small share of 
the overall tax burden, property tax funds a large breadth of direct public services to residents. 
It has been suggested that the incremental nature of other taxes, such as a weekly payroll 
deduction of income tax or a percentage mark up on the purchase of goods and services in the 
form of a sales tax, makes other forms of taxation less visible to the taxpayer (Slack, 2002). In 
contrast, a limited number of large installments (as is the process for most property tax billing 
cycles), results in much larger and more impactful payment process. This process is also 
accompanied by a limited time to pay and in most cases, significant penalties for late payment. 
Economists seem to dislike property taxes for different reasons altogether. Some view 
property tax as a tax on capital, often considered the worst type of taxation in terms of harming 
economic activity (Bird & Slack, 2002). Others will argue the regressive nature of property 
taxation, citing the fact that lower income earners pay a higher percentage of their income on 
property tax than do higher income earners (Thompson, 2014). Additionally, the ability to pay 
property taxes, despite the owned ‘wealth’ associated with the value of property, is a major 
shortcoming of taxing property based on assessed market value. This is especially true in 
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jurisdictions where market conditions have increased property values without a corresponding 
rise in property owner incomes.  
The property tax system in Ontario today includes a number of organizations and 
stakeholders, with specific areas of authority and responsibility as outlined in Table 3 below.  
Table 3: The Ontario System of Property Assessment and Taxation 
 
Organization:  Responsibility: 
The Province of Ontario Determine Provincial property tax policy, 
impose legislation to support tax policy. 
The Municipal Property Assessment 
Corporation 
Determine assessment value and tax 
classification of properties. 
Municipalities Determine local tax policy, set tax rates, tax 
ratios, administer property tax collection and 
inter-governmental distribution. 
The Assessment Review Board Independent adjudicative tribunal to hear 
appeals of assessed value, tax class, tax 
appeals. 
Property Owner Pay the levy imposed based on the assessed 
value of the property. 
Source: (MPAC, 2016) 
Municipal Tax Policy and Policy Framework: 
Whether explicitly stated, adequately planned, or competently implemented, any 
municipal mechanism that raises financial resources for the delivery of services should be 
considered tax policy. In its simplest form, "a policy is a course of action or inaction chosen by 
public authorities to address a given problem or interrelated set of problems" (Pal, 2010). Thus 
any decision to tax, raise funds or charge fees, can be interpreted as tax policy. It is not the 
individual tax policy decisions that are of significance, rather it is the adequacy and 
comprehensiveness of the municipal approach to tax policy framework development, 
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implementation, and analysis that has the greatest impact on shaping the future of a 
municipality. Unlike ‘policy’, which can reflect the narrowest of decisions made by a 
municipality, a ‘policy framework’ is a visionary approach that provides the rationale and 
philosophy to guide policy and program development (Province of British Columbia, 2000).  
A municipal tax policy framework is intimately related to each and every other policy 
framework developed within a municipality. Taxation allows for the delivery of a social policy 
framework (quality of life considerations, equality, etc.), of an infrastructure policy framework 
(sustainability, development, environmentalism, etc.), or any other policy framework 
established by the municipality. As the lack of formal tax policy framework development and 
analysis often leads to economically inefficient taxation, (Kennedy & McAllister, 2005) a formal 
policy framework will aid in avoiding haphazard and unguided taxation decisions.  
A tax policy framework will act as the cornerstone for establishing individual tax policy 
decisions, as is demonstrated by exploring the setting of user fees for a recreation complex. At 
one extreme, the recreation complex could be used by residents at no charge, thus funding 
operations entirely through the general tax levy. This inclusionary approach would open access 
to the facility for all members of the community, a truly progressive approach to providing 
recreational services. At the other extreme, a municipal recreation complex could be mandated 
to be financially self-sustaining, generating enough revenues through high user fees to cover all 
expenses. This approach would create exclusivity of access, benefitting those that can afford to 
pay high the fees, and excluding those that cannot. The reality is most municipalities have a tax 
policy model that establishes fees somewhere in between, relying on user fees to cover a 
portion of the expenses and taxation to cover the remainder. Determining the balance of 
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taxation funded versus user fee funded is a matter of tax policy. The push towards self-
sustaining financial plans for water services has led to a greater reliance on direct user fees, 
increasing the relative cost burden for poorer residents.   
Municipal tax policy developed under a comprehensive framework will be less susceptible 
to a ‘flavor of the day’ approach to policy development, and will be more resistant to the 
negative aspects of policy diffusion. Policy diffusion, where policies spread from one 
municipality to another, is not always positive (Shipman & Volden, 2012). The imitation and 
coercion mechanisms of policy diffusion can produce unintended consequences for the policy 
adopter, leading to unintended consequences such as a race to the bottom and the erosion of 
social equity programs (Shipman & Volden, 2012). 
Intelligent Tax Policy  
The public expects government to make intelligent decisions, not just decisions (Pal, 
2010). 
 “Intelligent decisions come from operating within some consistent framework, however 
general….. the very nature of intelligent and accountable governance in a democracy 
demands more than mere decisions-it demands decision making guided by a framework. 
In short, we expect that our governments have policies” (Pal, 2010). 
Through establishing tax policies, municipalities have the opportunity to shape the structure 
and future of their communities (Kennedy & McAllister, 2005). The annual budget document is 
the way in which municipalities typically set tax policy in practice.  While the annual budget is in 
fact a policy document as defined above, there is an important distinction between decisions 
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and intelligent decisions as noted by Pal. Without an established policy framework, intelligent 
policy decisions contained in the budget can only occur through happenstance and it is unlikely 
that the most appropriate tax policy decisions will be made in the absence of a framework. It is 
not enough to participate in a process of annual expenditure allocation, service level review, 
and tax rate and user fee determination. While establishing tax rates and collecting funds to 
pay for goods and services does represent tax policy (as illustrated above), these decisions must 
all flow from a pre-established tax policy framework in order to be considered intelligent. As is 
the case for income tax policies, modern evidence and experiences must be considered when 
analyzing existing property tax policy and developing policy goals for the future (Milligan, 2014). 
Dedicated Resources and Research Blueprints: 
One of the challenges facing municipalities in developing a tax policy framework is rooted 
in the complexity of the policy considerations, and the resources needed to adequately analyze 
and predict expected outcomes. At the Federal level, the Department of Finance has a 
dedicated tax policy branch. This branch is responsible for researching and analyzing the 
expected outcomes of various tax policy considerations, and for generating suggested 
alternative tax policy considerations (Ernewein & Horsman, 2013).  
There appears to be minimal policy research that can be relied upon by municipalities to 
understand and anticipate the outcomes of their tax policy decisions. As a result, there is a lack 
of appropriate analysis, development, documentation and publication of tax policy decisions. 
This in turn results is very little strategic tax policy decisions at the municipal level beyond short 
term financial sustainability found in the annual budget process. 
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1.6.2 User Fees 
Perhaps the greatest threat to progressiveness in municipal tax policy frameworks is the 
ever increasing reliance on user fees, a phenomenon that has been occurring in the drinking 
water sector. Property taxes are often cited as problematic due to the regressive nature of the 
tax, with a lack of association between the amount of tax paid, and the income of the payer. 
While the progressive nature of income tax improved income equality in Canada by 11%, the 
effect of property tax eroded the income inequality achieved by income tax by 2% (Chawla & 
Wannell, 2003). Further, households with an income below $20,000 paid over 10% of their 
household income on property tax, while households with incomes above $100,000 paid less 
than 2% (Palameta & Macredie, 2005). Unlike income taxes in Ontario, where the tax rate 
applied increases with greater amount of income earned, the Municipal Act, 2001 only permits 
graduated property tax rates on commercial and industrial property classes. Thus a home 
valued at $1 million will pay the same property tax rate as a $100,000 home in the same 
municipality (though 10 times the total tax). Despite concerns related to property taxes and the 
ability to pay, there is at least a positive correlation between income and home values 
(Hancock, 2004), and thus an outcome where wealthier people, who own more valuable 
homes, pay more property tax. Such is not the case with flat user fees. 
Flat user fees charge the same fee per household regardless of the consumption or use of 
the good. This would be reflected in the ‘Flat Fee’ water pricing model discussed earlier. This 
results in the wealthiest of residents paying the same for public services, such as for the supply 
of drinking water, as the poorest residents. This outcome makes flat user fees the most 
regressive income source for local government revenues. There are user fee models for 
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drinking water that improve the progressivity of user fees when they are linked to volumetric 
consumption and utilize inclining block pricing that provides at a very low cost (or no cost at all)  
a volume of water required for basic human needs.  
Part 2: The Affordability of Water in Windsor and Essex County 
2.1 Literature Review 
The published literature which explores the nature of water services, the affordability of 
water and the ways in which water should be priced, and the concept of social equity and 
fairness in water pricing, is quite extensive. This literature seems to suggest a consensus 
recognition of the trade-off between equity and efficiency in pricing the provision of the water 
services. In addressing, (or failing to address) this trade-off, the research typically takes one of 
three approaches. The approach depends greatly on whether water is being defined primarily 
as a private good (efficiency is dominant), as a public good (equity is dominant), or if the 
author(s) strives to address both economic efficiency with equity (equity and efficiency are 
balanced). 
Efficiency is dominant: much of this line of research chooses to ignore the social equity 
consideration, focusing instead on pure economic and financial considerations in the pricing of 
water as a commodity. This research focuses on either capturing the ‘full-cost’ of providing 
water services and recommends a correlating pricing model that covers this cost, or by 
empirically suggesting that the current price being charged for water in the study area fails to 
even address direct cost of providing service. In the former, this includes capturing more 
abstract cost concepts in the provision of water services such as a rate of return on capital, 
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environmental costs such as pollution, raw water costs, and costing similar externalities 
associated with the consumption of energy in the supply of water (Renzetti & Kushner, Full Cost 
Accounting for Water Supply and Sewage Treatment: Concepts and Case Application, 2004) 
(Dupont & Renzetti, 2008). The latter examines actual cost recoveries through rates against the 
required revenues to maintain full cost recovery, concluding that rates are too low which 
results in over-consumption and a general lack of conservation. 
Equity is dominant: Interpreting water as more of a public good results in various research 
conclusions supporting matters such as the human right to water in an affordable and socially 
equitable manner (Meier & et al, 2014) (Butts & Gasteyer, 2011)., Similar research focuses less 
on determining whether the price charged for water is adequate to cover costs of providing the 
service, as is the case when efficiency is dominant, and instead determines the affordability of 
water for poor citizens, the ability to pay, and the benefit received (Pashardes & Hajispyrou, 
2002). Building on the importance of water affordability, the research examines water pricing 
models, both utilized in practice or conceptualized in theory, that improve the affordability of 
water and improve social equity (Butts & Gasteyer, 2011) (Teodoro M. P., 2005) (Barberan & 
Arbues, 2009), (Wasimi & Hassa, 2012) (Goffa & Crow, 2014). 
Equity and efficiency are balanced: Still other research examines the issue of water pricing 
while attempting to strike a balance between equity and efficiency in water pricing 
determination. This research explores the social considerations of affordability, ability to pay 
and benefit received, against efficiency measures such as full cost recovery, price, marginal 
benefit and cost parity, and conservation (Rogersa & et al, 2002) (Porcher, 2014) (Renzetti & et 
al, 2015). 
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Efficiency trade-offs and the externalities related to matters of conservation and preservation, 
cannot be ignored and must form part of any pragmatic and responsible water pricing model. A 
short description of existing literature aligning closely to this research paper includes the 
following: 
Organization for Economic Development and Co-Operation, Social Issues in the Provision and 
Pricing of Water Services, 2002, Paris. 
The Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation examined the links 
between social issues and the pricing of water services. The report examined many aspects of 
the provision of water services provided by member countries, focused on the affordability of 
water services, and examined the social measures used by participating countries to address 
the issue of water affordability. 
The report identified: 
i) The increasing cost of water service and the prediction of continued cost increases 
ii)  The formal evidence of water affordability problems for low income households 
given income levels and the burden of water costs. The report suggested 
affordability problems in half of the member countries, either now or in the 
foreseeable future 
iii) The two main policy categories being implemented to address affordability 
challenges; income support and tariff adjustment, and the different ways in which 
both policy options were being used to address water affordability concerns. 
iv) As the cost of water continues to rise, there will be an increasing need for 
governments to address the affordability challenges through the use of the income 
support and tariff adjustment. 
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Teodoro, Manuel P., Measuring Fairness: Assessing the Equity of Municipal Water Rates. 
American Water Works Association, 97 (4) 2005. 
This research developed metrics to measure water rate equity. The stated goal of the 
research was to provide information and education to those charged with determining water 
rates, and to provide additional tools in the rate setting process.  The research identifies equity 
scores for individual water customers, as well as progressivity indexes for various water rate 
structures. 
Wasimi, S. A. and Hassa, S., "Social Considerations in Domestic Water Pricing: A Case Study of 
Perth, Western Australia". Australian Journal of Water Resources, 15(2) 2012. 
The researcher conducted an in-depth examination of the existing Increasing Block Tariff 
(IBT) water rate structure of the City of Perth, Australia, in an attempt to identify a water rate 
structure that optimizes social equity. The researchers used an optimization tool to determine 
recommended block sizes and pricing tiers, while considering economic, environmental and 
social factors.  Social considerations were operationalized into variables such as household size, 
incomes, etc. The pricing scheme was operationalized into fixed portions, various consumption 
blocks, and associated pricing blocks. The researchers were able to suggest a socially optimal 
IBT pricing model for the Perth water system through their research. 
Ramón Barberán, Fernando Arbués. “Equity in Domestic Water Rates Design”, Water 
Resources Management, 23(10) 2009. 
The stated objective of this paper was to examine the operational effectiveness of the 
equity criterion in domestic water rate design. Much like the intent of this research paper, the 
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authors were interested in contributing to a solution to the equity problems caused by the 
application of water rates. In particular, the authors were examining the impact of the 
increasing block tariff rate structure in relation to household size. The paper establishes and 
defines normative criteria used in determining equitable water pricing as follows: 
i) Full Cost Recovery: Revenues collected through the water rate design should cover 
expenditures resulting in a self-sustaining financial model or ‘budget self-
sufficiency’. 
ii) Efficiency: The maximizing of net community benefit, such that users will buy water 
in a quantity that gives a marginal benefit higher than the marginal cost, often 
adjusted for environmental considerations.  
iii) Equity: Includes philosophical and social considerations as well as value judgements. 
Approaches to equity include the benefit principle and the ability to pay principle. 
The former establishes pricing based on the benefit received, and is more suitable 
when the consumer has options, the latter better suited for public goods. 
iv) Simplicity: Rate structures should be cost-efficient to implement and manage, and 
the users of the system need on understand the system and the consequence of 
their actions. 
The author then conducts a case study on Zaragoza, Spain. Based on an analysis and using the 
normative criteria, the article then proposes a design for a more equitable increasing block 
tariff water rate that ensures individuals will be able to meet their basic water needs at the 
same cost, regardless of the size of the household in which they live. 
2.2 The Affordability of Water in Southwestern Ontario  
Canada is globally recognized as having both accessible and affordable water for its 
citizens (Vander Ploeg, 2011). The access and affordability achievements are not universal 
however, with remote and indigenous communities struggling to build, operate and maintain 
adequate treatment facilities (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Furthermore, while affordability 
may be, on average, well within the range of affordability targets for the average population, 
Page 40 of 57 
 
rising water rates may be posing affordability challenges for the poor of Ontario. This research 
will examine this consideration in more detail. 
In order to examine water affordability in Southwestern Ontario, actual water rate data, 
both the rate model used, as well as the actual charges, was collected from the eight most 
Southern municipalities in Southwestern Ontario which make up the County of Essex and the 
City of Windsor. These municipalities include the Town of Amherstburg (Amherstburg), the 
Town of Kingsville (Kingsville) the Town of Lakeshore (Lakeshore), the Town of Lasalle (LaSalle) 
the Town of Tecumseh (Tecumseh), the Town of Essex (Essex), the City of Windsor (Windsor) 
and the Municipality of Leamington (Leamington).  
The average water used per person per day in Canada; 251 liters (Environment Canada, 
2014) multiplied by the average persons per household in Ontario; 2.6 (Statistics Canada, 2011), 
reveals the average Ontario household consumes just under 20 cubic meters of water per 
month. The 20 cubic meter average monthly water consumption was then used to calculate the 
average annual water bill for the nine communities examined using published 2016 Water 
Rates for the communities. The results are noted in Table 4 below: 
Table 4: Average Annual Cost of Water per Household 
 
Kingsville 5.67$                      0.90$                      92                            2.6                          282$                             
LaSalle 15.00$                   0.87$                      92                            2.6                          387$                             
Tecumseh 12.62$                   1.13$                      92                            2.6                          421$                             
Leamington 21.06$                   0.79$                      92                            2.6                          441$                             
Windsor 24.42$                   0.52$                      92                            2.6                          472$                             
Amherstburg 20.05$                   1.06$                      92                            2.6                          493$                             
Lakeshore 19.62$                   1.44$                      92                            2.6                          578$                             
Essex 18.92$                   1.48$                      92                            2.6                          580$                             
Municipality
Monthly Fixed 
Charge Cost / M3
Cubic Meters/ 
Person / Year
Average Persons 
/ Household
Average Annual 
Cost / Household
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As is demonstrated above, there is great variation in water pricing, even within this cluster of 
communities in Southwestern Ontario. The highest annual cost (Essex) is over twice the cost of 
the lowest cost municipality (Kingsville).  
While this paper is primarily examining the affordability of water services, a brief look at 
costs to provide sanitary services should also be explored in this section. The gross cost for the 
average Ontario household reviewed above does not take into account associated sewer 
surcharge costs. While one could argue that the sewer surcharge is applied for a completely 
different municipal service, most municipalities, including all of those examined in 
Southwestern Ontario, apply a mandatory sewer surcharge to user water bills, most of which is 
calculated based on water consumption. From a payment perspective, these public utilities 
treat the charges as one in the same. If a resident is to be supplied water, they must also pay a 
mandatory sewer surcharge if the service is available to them. This charge typically pays for the 
cost to collect, convey, and treat sanitary sewage. Much like the regressive nature of water 
charges, sanitary surcharges are the same for all residential users of the system, charging low 
income households the same rates as high income households.  Table 5 indicates annual sewer 
surcharge costs in the subject municipalities.  
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Table 5: Average Annual Sewer Surcharge per Household 
*Billing structure includes only fixed charges 
** 21 m3 per month included in fix charge. Average Consumption above < 21m3 per month. 
 
The gross costs examined in tables 4 and 5 provide simply that, average cost of the 
service. In order to understand affordability of water generally, these costs must compared 
against household income, and examined using a measure of affordability. Therefore Table 6 
below introduces average household income to the examination of gross water costs to 
determine the average percentage of house hold income currently allocated to the purchase of 
drinking water in these communities. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
affordability threshold of requiring water cost to be less than 3 % of household income to be 
considered affordable, will be relied upon to determine affordability (UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 2010). 
The UN-Water Decade Programme on Advocacy and Communication and Water Supply 
and Sanitation Collaborative Council has determined that the cost for water and sanitation 
facilities and services should not exceed 5% of a household’s income. If this is achieved, it 
should not affect the ability to purchase other services such as food, housing, health and 
education. (UN-Water Decade Programme on Advocacy and Communication and Water Supply 
and Sanitation Collaborative Council, 2011).  
Kingsville* 24.52$                   - 92                            2.6                          294$                             
LaSalle 6.00$                      0.87$                      92                            2.6                          279$                             
Tecumseh 12.62$                   1.16$                      92                            2.6                          428$                             
Leamington** 42.19$                   - 92                            2.6                          506$                             
Windsor 15.87$                   2.35$                      92                            2.6                          750$                             
Amherstburg 30.46$                   2.06$                      92                            2.6                          856$                             
Lakeshore 15.07$                   1.30$                      92                            2.6                          490$                             
Essex 19.16$                   1.68$                      92                            2.6                          630$                             
Municipality
Monthly Fixed 
Charge Cost / M3
Cubic Meters/ 
Person / Year
Average Persons 
/ Household
Average Annual 
Cost / Household
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TABLE 6: Water, Wastewater, and Combined Costs as a Percentage of Household Income 
 
* (Statistics Canada, 2011) 
 
As is illustrated in Table 6, in all eight communities examined in Southwestern Ontario, 
water can be considered affordable for the average household. However, this consideration 
looks at average income, and does not measure impact on the poorest residents, who must pay 
the same price for drinking water as the wealthy. Water affordability will now be examined 
against the minimum income amounts of Ontario’s three most prevalent income support 
programs (ODSP, OW, and Guaranteed Income Supplement). 
2.3 The Affordability of Water for the Poor in Southwestern Ontario  
2.3.1 Defining the Poor 
Ontario has established three primary income support programs for the poorest of 
Ontario residents. While there are inevitably some residents who choose not to take 
advantage of the guaranteed minimum income supplements associated with these 
programs, for the purpose of this research, only the minimum income amounts under these 
Kingsville 282$                 78,942 0.36% 294$                    577 0.73%
LaSalle 387$                 103,034 0.38% 279$                    666 0.65%
Tecumseh 421$                 99,800 0.42% 428$                    849 0.85%
Leamington 441$                 65,713 0.67% 506$                    947 1.44%
Windsor 472$                 62,175 0.76% 750$                    1,223 1.97%
Amherstburg 493$                 86,116 0.57% 856$                    1,349 1.57%
Lakeshore 578$                 95,625 0.60% 490$                    1,069 1.12%
Essex 580$                 74,902 0.77% 630$                    1,210 1.62%
Municipality
Average 
Annual Water 
Cost (See 
Table 4)
Average 
Household 
Income*
Combined 
Costs as a % 
of Income
Water Cost 
as a % of 
Income
Average 
Annual Sanitary 
Sewer Cost 
(See Table 5)
Combined 
Water and 
Sanitary Sewer 
Costs
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programs will be examined. Thus if an eligible individual(s) elected not to take advantage of 
the social assistance programs, they may survive on less than the minimum income amounts 
discussed below. 
Ontario Works 
In the Province of Ontario, if a household does not have sufficient financial resources 
to meet basic living expenses, they will be eligible for financial assistance through the 
Ontario Works program. This income support is intended to help with the costs of basic 
needs, like food, clothing and shelter (Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, 
2016). This program can be considered the basic social assistance or ‘welfare’ program in 
Ontario. The amount of financial assistance available will vary depending on the size of the 
family, the location, and various living expenses.  
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) 
To ensure a minimum income threshold for seniors in Canada, the Canadian Federal 
Government provides a Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) program to low income seniors 
(over the age of 65) who are also receiving the Old Age Security (OAS) benefit. The Guaranteed 
Income Supplement ensures that each and every Canadian over the age of 65 receives no less 
than $17,544 in annual income ($1,462 per month). Seniors earning less than $17,544 will 
receive the supplement to raise their income to this minimum amount. Seniors with an income 
greater than $17,544 will not receive the GIS (Government of Canada, 2016). 
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iii) Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) 
The Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) provides income support for disabled 
individuals living in Ontario who need financial help with basic living expenses. Much like OW 
and GIS discussed above, the ODSP social assistance program is means tested, and ensures a 
basic minimum amount of income for individuals with a disability. 
A comparison of the minimum income amounts of the three main social assistance 
programs in the province of Ontario, is provided below: 
Table 7: Comparison of Minimum Annual Income for Social Assistance Programs in Ontario 
Social 
Assistance 
Program 
Single  Couple 
Single- 1 
Child 
Single- 2 
Children 
Couple- 1 
Child 
Couple-2 
Children 
GIS/GAINS $17,544 $23,184 X X X X 
OW $8,472 $13,140 $12,948 $14,940 $15,132 $17,172 
ODSP $13,536 $19,896 $22,008 $20,256 $22,365 $24,564 
Source: (Income Security Advocacy Centre, 2016), (Government of Canada, 2016) 
 
2.3.2 Examination of Affordability of Water for the Poor in Southwestern Ontario  
In Table 8 below, the minimum income amounts identified in Table 7 are used to 
determine the affordability of water in the eight subject municipalities in Southwestern 
Ontario. The total annual estimated cost of water in each municipality identified in Table 8, is 
calculated using the actual 2016 water billing rate models for each municipality. 
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Table 8: Affordability of Water for the Poor  
 
 
Affordability of Water by Municipality (See Appendix A for further detail)
Social Assistance Program Income Leamington % of Income Amherstburg % of Income
GIS/Gains
Single 17,544$          325$                1.9% 338$                1.9%
Couple 23,184$          397$                1.7% 435$                1.9%
OW
Single 8,472$            325$                3.8% 338$                4.0%
Couple 13,140$          397$                3.0% 435$                3.3%
Single- 1 Child 12,948$          325$                2.5% 435$                3.4%
Single- 2 Children 14,940$          470$                3.1% 532$                3.6%
Couple- 1 Child 15,132$          470$                3.1% 532$                3.5%
Couple-2 Children 17,172$          542$                3.2% 629$                3.7%
ODSP
Single 13,536$          325$                2.4% 338$                2.5%
Couple 19,896$          397$                2.0% 435$                2.2%
Single- 1 Child 22,008$          325$                1.5% 435$                2.0%
Single- 2 Children 20,256$          470$                2.3% 532$                2.6%
Couple- 1 Child 22,365$          470$                2.1% 532$                2.4%
Couple-2 Children 24,564$          542$                2.2% 629$                2.6%
Affordability of Water by Municipality (See Appendix A for further detail)
Social Assistance Program Income Tecumseh % of Income Lakeshore % of Income
GIS/Gains
Single 17,544$          255$                1.5% 367$                2.1%
Couple 23,184$          359$                1.5% 499$                2.2%
OW
Single 8,472$            255$                3.0% 367$                4.3%
Couple 13,140$          359$                2.7% 499$                3.8%
Single- 1 Child 12,948$          359$                2.8% 499$                3.9%
Single- 2 Children 14,940$          463$                3.1% 631$                4.2%
Couple- 1 Child 15,132$          463$                3.1% 631$                4.2%
Couple-2 Children 17,172$          566$                3.3% 763$                4.4%
ODSP
Single 13,536$          255$                1.9% 367$                2.7%
Couple 19,896$          359$                1.8% 499$                2.5%
Single- 1 Child 22,008$          359$                1.6% 499$                2.3%
Single- 2 Children 20,256$          463$                2.3% 631$                3.1%
Couple- 1 Child 22,365$          463$                2.1% 631$                2.8%
Couple-2 Children 24,564$          566$                2.3% 763$                3.1%
Page 47 of 57 
 
Table 8 Continued: 
 
 
Affordability of Water by Municipality (See Appendix A for further detail)
Social Assistance Program Income Essex % of Income LaSalle % of Income
GIS/Gains
Single 17,544$          363$                2.1% 260$                1.5%
Couple 23,184$          498$                2.1% 339$                1.5%
OW
Single 8,472$            363$                4.3% 260$                3.1%
Couple 13,140$          498$                3.8% 339$                2.6%
Single- 1 Child 12,948$          498$                3.8% 339$                2.6%
Single- 2 Children 14,940$          634$                4.2% 419$                2.8%
Couple- 1 Child 15,132$          634$                4.2% 419$                2.8%
Couple-2 Children 17,172$          769$                4.5% 499$                2.9%
ODSP
Single 13,536$          363$                2.7% 260$                1.9%
Couple 19,896$          498$                2.5% 339$                1.7%
Single- 1 Child 22,008$          498$                2.3% 339$                1.5%
Single- 2 Children 20,256$          634$                3.1% 419$                2.1%
Couple- 1 Child 22,365$          634$                2.8% 419$                1.9%
Couple-2 Children 24,564$          769$                3.1% 499$                2.0%
Affordability of Water by Municipality (See Appendix A for further detail)
Social Assistance Program Income Kingsville % of Income Windsor % of Income
GIS/Gains
Single 17,544$          150$                0.9% 362$                2.1%
Couple 23,184$          233$                1.0% 431$                1.9%
OW
Single 8,472$            150$                1.8% 362$                4.3%
Couple 13,140$          233$                1.8% 431$                3.3%
Single- 1 Child 12,948$          233$                1.8% 431$                3.3%
Single- 2 Children 14,940$          315$                2.1% 500$                3.3%
Couple- 1 Child 15,132$          315$                2.1% 500$                3.3%
Couple-2 Children 17,172$          398$                2.3% 569$                3.3%
ODSP
Single 13,536$          150$                1.1% 362$                2.7%
Couple 19,896$          233$                1.2% 431$                2.2%
Single- 1 Child 22,008$          233$                1.1% 431$                2.0%
Single- 2 Children 20,256$          315$                1.6% 500$                2.5%
Couple- 1 Child 22,365$          315$                1.4% 500$                2.2%
Couple-2 Children 24,564$          398$                1.6% 569$                2.3%
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The results of the affordability examination of the eight subject municipalities in 
Southwestern Ontario has revealed that the cost of water in these municipalities can, in almost 
all circumstances, also be considered affordable. The only exceptions were identified in the 
Ontario Works incomes as identified by the shaded cells.   
Part 3: Improving Affordability and Equity through Water Pricing 
Methodology 
 
Municipalities wishing to implement intelligent and strategic tax policy to improve 
affordability and social equity in their communities, can establish water rate models to achieve 
the desired outcomes. While some rather unique water pricing methodologies have been 
examined and implemented worldwide to improve social equity in water pricing, such as 
inclining block tariff structures that are influenced by income and household size (Wasimi & 
Hassa, 2012), (Barberán & Arbués, 2009), such an approach would likely prove impractical in 
Ontario. Given the separation of jurisdictional authority between the Province of Ontario and 
Ontario municipalities, attempting to collect, maintain, and verify this additional customer 
information by municipalities for the sole purpose of determining household water rates would 
prove complicated and administratively burdensome. As a result, it is suggested that the three 
recommendations below would be practical and realistic considerations for Ontario 
municipalities wishing to adopt a more equitable manner in which to charge for water and to 
make water more affordable for those with the least ability to pay. 
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3.1 Recommendation #1: Use Alternative Revenue Sources to Cover Costs 
The generally accepted principle, and legislative requirement in Ontario (Safe Drinking 
Water Act, 2002),  that drinking water supply systems must have a fully sustainable financial 
model is often misinterpreted to mean that direct user fees must be set at a value to achieve 
full cost recovery. The notion that water supply systems must be fully self-sustaining through 
rates alone, and that direct fees charged for the delivery of water must cover all costs, is not a 
requirement in Ontario (Safe Drinking Water Act, 2002). Improving water affordability for low 
income households could involve moving some of the costs of the treatment and supply of 
drinking water away from user fees, and on to general taxation. There exists a long list of 
publicly supplied goods and services which have characteristics similar to that of drinking water, 
but that draw their funding from general taxation revenues such as property taxation, income 
tax revenues, commodity taxes, etc. In the local government context, this includes services such 
as recreation, sanitation, roads, and parks services. As a result, municipalities have the ability to 
use other revenue sources, such as property taxation revenue or provincial transfer payments 
(such as the unencumbered Ontario Municipal Partnership Fund (OMPF) for northern and rural 
communities), to reduce the price of water for residential consumers. While property tax is not 
typically considered progressive taxation, since property tax imposes taxes on the market value 
of the home as opposed to the income of the homeowner and does not consider the ability to 
pay, there nonetheless exists a correlation between the value of a home and the income of the 
homeowner (Hancock, 2004).  
Water should not be isolated and treated as a distinct public good simply because 
consumption is easily measured. Much like the greater societal benefits derived from a publicly 
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funded health care system, providing clean, safe drinking water to residents has far reaching 
societal benefits and should not be approached as a commercial business transaction. 
3.2 Recommendation #2: Use Strategic Inclining Block Tariff Structures 
Only 9% of Ontario Municipalities are currently using inclining block tariff structures, 
while 65% use a uniform rate model (BMA, 2015). Inclining block structures have the benefit of 
permitting those with the least ability to pay, to consume less water and pay a lower rate for 
the water they consume. Wealthier customers, who consume more water than the poor 
(Wasimi & Hassa, 2012), would pay a higher cost for the water consumed above established 
thresholds.  
It has been suggested that the water required to meet basic human needs and promote 
heath is 50 liters(L) per person per day (5L drinking water, 20L sanitation, 15L bathing, 10L food 
preparation)  (Gleick, 1999). Given that the average Canadian consumes over five times this 
amount at 251 liters per person per day (Environment Canada, 2011), it is clear that Canadians 
are excessive users of water. Despite this, and in recognition of the basic human right to water, 
it is recommended that a lifeline volume of water should be provided to each residential 
customer at minimal, to no charge. The lifeline quantity could be established at 130L per 
household day, or 4 cubic meters of water per residential customer per month (50 liters*2.6 
persons*30days). Beyond this lifeline amount, the cost and volume included in the various 
block structures can be strategically established to promote conservation and give those with 
the least ability to pay to control their water consumption if they wish to do so. 
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3.3 Recommendation #3: Reduce Fixed Charges 
 
High fixed charges reduce the incentive to conserve and results in those using less water 
per billing cycle, paying a higher average cost per unit of water consumed (the fixed costs are 
spread over less units consumed) . Residential customers that pay a fixed fee for water, as 
opposed to metered charges, use 65% more water per capita (Environment Canada, 2014). The 
higher the fixed fees, the more the billing structure will resemble a fixed fee model. As a result, 
fixed charges should make up a very minimal part of the average residential water bill. While 
determining the recommended fixed charge percentage of the bill is beyond the scope of this 
paper, it is suggested that a municipality’s tolerance for managing revenue instability will play a 
large role in that determination. The higher the tolerance for revenue instability, the greater 
the ability to establish lower fixed charges. Of the eight municipalities examined in this paper, 
fixed costs made up 45% of the water bill on average (Table 4). 
3.4 Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated that in the eight communities examined in Southwestern 
Ontario, residential drinking water can be considered quite affordable for the average 
household, and generally affordable even for the poorest households. Despite this affordability, 
this paper has also demonstrated that through establishing and implementing intelligent tax 
policy, municipalities can determine pricing strategies that shift some of the cost burden from 
those with the least ability to pay, to those with a greater ability to pay.  
Further research topics related to this report include examining and identifying the 
optimal percentage of fixed fees in relation to the total average cost of water. This optimal 
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percentage would promote conservation and improve affordability for those with the least 
ability to pay. Additionally, defining the optimal ‘blocks’ in the inclining block ratio model, both 
from a volumetric as well as a cost perspective, will aid municipalities in determining a cost 
structure most likely to result in their desired policy outcomes. Understanding the factors that 
influenced municipalities to adopt more sophisticated pricing strategies, like the 32% of the 100 
municipalities surveyed in the 2015 BMA Study who have adopted inclining , declining and 
humpback tariff pricing, would assist decision makers in advancing their own public policy 
agenda. Finally, research that examines what social factors, if any, Ontario municipalities have 
considered historically when establishing water pricing models, will help gain an appreciation 
for the current level of sophistication in the process of establishing municipal tax policy in this 
area. 
While affordability examines the ability to pay, equity examines the fairness in the cost 
structure. With so much focus on quality assurance and regulatory compliance in the water 
sector in Ontario in the aftermath of the Walkerton tragedy, it is important to engage in 
conversation regarding access to water, affordability of water, intelligent tax policy, and equity 
in water pricing.  
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